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FOREWORD:
THE ABOLITION OF PUBLIC RACIAL
PREFERENCE - AN INVITATION TO
PRIVATE RACIAL SENSITIVITY
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC*
This volume is about race. In the Catholic, if not larger
Judeo-Christian tradition, race is morally irrelevant. We are all
created in God's image,' and therefore skin color tells us noth-
ing about a person's intellectual, spiritual, or moral worth. And
yet, race is not unknown to our lives. Census data, rates of illegit-
imacy, school admissions, employment practices, housing pat-
terns, religious beliefs, sporting interests, criminal prosecutions,
prison populations, to mention but a few obvious subjects, have
persistent racial compositions.
The papers in this symposium ask plaintively, if sometimes
only implicitly: why - as we approach a new millennium -
haven't we transcended race? Ultimately, they supply no defini-
tive answer. Yet, in exploring the topic from legal, religious,
empirical, and even'literary perspectives, the contributors to this
volume invite, indeed demand, that each of us not complacently
assume that ignoring the issue will settle it.
This is not to say that constitutional interpretation has not
consciously, if glacially and not always directly, evolved toward a
standard of color-blindness. The spurious decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson,2 thirty years after the Fourteenth Amendment was
drafted to secure the "equal protection of the laws," was the first
to go badly awry. In Pessy, the Court upheld a state law requiring
"separate but equal" railway accommodations on the basis of
race.' In a vigorous dissent, the seniorJustice Harlan wrote: "But
* Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Notre Dame and
founder of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy.
1. "God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created
him, male and female he created them." Genesis 1:27 (New International
Version). "God's word in Genesis announces that all men and women are
created in God's image; not just some races and racial types, but all bear the
imprint of the Creator and are enlivened by the breath of His one Spirit."
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOuC BISHOPS, BROTHERS AND SISTERS TO US,
para. 7 (Nov. 14, 1979).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Id.
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in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is
no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. "' Eighty years later,
Thurgood Marshall, the Court's first African-American justice
disputed Harlan's claim to support a race-conscious admissions
policy at a public university. Marshall wrote:
[H]ad the Court been willing in 1896, in [Pessy], to hold
that [equal protection] forbids differences in treatment
based on race, we would not be faced with this dilemma in
1978. We must remember, however, that the principle that
the "Constitution is colorblind" appeared only in the opin-
ion of the lone dissenter.5
The Harlan-Marshall quotations frame the historical debate
regarding the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What did the Amendment mean by "equality"? Were white per-
sons, as well as black, thought to be within the scope of the equal
protection guarantee? If so, did the drafters and ratifiers of the
Amendment ever contemplate that long-term programs of spe-
cial treatment in favor of one race would be constitutional?
In terms of equality, those contemporary with the drafting of
the Amendment understood that the law could create conditions
of equality of opportunity, but not result. For example, Con-
gressman Butler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee a few years after the Amendment's ratification, explained the
meaning of equality in reference to the similar principle in the
Declaration of Independence. Butler stated:
I believe that "equal" in the Declaration of Independence
is a political word, used in a political sense, and means
equality of political rights. All men are not equal. Some
are born with good constitutions, good health, strength,
high mental power; others are not. Now, we cannot by leg-
islation make them equal. God has not made them equal,
with equal endowments. But this is our doctrine: Equality
... and I will embody it in a single phrase, as the true
touchstone of civil liberty - is not that all men are equal,
but that every man has the right to be the equal of every
other if he can.6
Butler's perspective is clearly that of someone who intends to
provide individual opportunity, not the redistribution of benefits
4. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401 (1978).
6. CONG. GLoBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 413 (1874).
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to a racial group. In this, it is much different from that ofJustice
Marshall, who argues:
It is unnecessary in 20th century America to have individ-
ual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of
racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so
pervasive... [and] we now must permit the institutions of
this society to give consideration to race in making deci-
sions about who will hold positions of influence, affluence
and prestige.
7
Despite Plessy's misstep, and others that followed, the Four-
teenth Amendment originally applied to citizens of all races.
Senator Howard in 1866 reflected that Congress intended to
"abolish[ ] all class legislation... and do[ ] away with the injus-
tice of subjecting one cast of persons to a code not applicable to
another."' Similarly, Senator Stevens commented that "no dis-
tinction would be tolerated in this purified republic but what
arose from merit or conduct."9 Finally, Senator Wilson pointedly
stated: "[W] e mean that the poorest man, be he black or white
... is as much entitled to the protection of the law as the richest
and the proudest man in the land.... [W] e have advocated the
rights of the black man because the black man was the most
oppressed." 10
Wilson's comment is revealing because it helps explain some
arguably race-conscious behavior on the part of the Thirty-ninth
Congress that drafted and passed the Fourteenth Amendment.
As I explained in an earlier work,1 during the Civil War a propo-
sal was considered to establish a Bureau of Freedmen's Affairs to
assist freed slaves in leasing property, entering into employment
contracts, and other related matters. The bill did not pass
because of strong opposition to the race-based benefits it pro-
vided, and as unfamiliar as it may sound to present ears, because
members of Congress strongly felt that social welfare schemes
were the sole province of the states. One House report stated
flatly:
A proposition to establish a bureau of Irishmen's affairs, a
bureau of Dutchmen's affairs, or one for the affairs of
those of Caucasian descent generally, who are incapable of
properly managing or taking care of their own interests by
reason of a neglected or deficient education, would ... be
7. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400-01 (Marshall, J., concurring).
8. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
9. Id. at 65.
10. Id. at 343.
11. DouGLAs W. KMIEC, THE AtoRNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER 156-57 (1992).
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looked upon as the vagary of a diseased brain .... Why the
freedmen of African descent should become these marked
objects of special legislation, to the detriment of the unfor-
tunate whites, your committee fail [s] to comprehend .... 12
In response, the proponents of a Freedmen's Bureau subtly
changed their arguments. The bill, it was argued, was merely a
temporary expedient to rectify the mistreatment of the slaves.
The Bureau was needed "not because these people are negroes,
but because they are men who have been for generations
despoiled of their rights.""3 Thus, the Bureau was not a perma-
nent recognition of race, but an effort to help former slaves
become self-sufficient.
It was a reasonable "special case" argument, but it too was
contested. For example, the proponents of short-term assistance
to the recently freed slaves attempted to analogize the Bureau's
legislation to that which gave special benefits to Indian tribes.
Few thought the analogy apt, however, insofar as tribes were
effectively separate sovereign units, and the special federal efforts
on their behalf reflected that fact as well as their prior possessory
claim on the territory of the United States.
14
When the next Congress took the Bureau legislation up
again, it passed and was signed into law by President Lincoln in
March 1865.15 But this time there was a crucial difference. The
1865 legislation specifically provided that the relief was intended
not only for the freed slaves, but also for the white refugees from
the rebel states. This diluted the racial nature of the original
proposal and focused the new law on those injured. The assist-
ance to the generation of freed slaves could be justified in 1865
as reparation for government-fostered deprivation. So too, the
limitation of the assistance to refugees from the rebel states tended
to confirm that the Congress viewed the legislation as necessary
because of specific and extraordinary devastation contemporary
with the Civil War.
When the Freedmen's Bureau was sought to be reauthorized
in 1866, renewed objection was made to any "class legislation -
legislation for a particular class of the blacks to the exclusion of
all whites." 16 It was strongly argued that any such partiality would
be "in opposition to the plain spirit pervading nearly every sec-
12. H.P. REP. No. 38-2, at 2-4 (1864).
13. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2800 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Sumner (quoting Secretary of War Stanton)).
14. See id. at 3346 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, 508.
16. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 544 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Taylor).
FOREWORD
tion of the Constitution that congressional legislation should in
its operation affect all alike." 17 Again, the supporters of the legis-
lation pointed to the measure's victim-specific nature and that
the measure was temporary. For example, the Bill's author
argued that "[w]e shall not long have to support any of these
blacks out of the public Treasury if we educate and furnish them
land upon which they can make a living for themselves."18
The Bill passed, but Andrew Johnson vetoed the measure
because he was concerned about its class implications, the dis-
placement of state authority, and the extent of Congress' consti-
tutional authority. While the vote in the Senate was insufficient
to override Johnson's veto, the Senate arguments made in favor
of override stressed the legislation's victim specificity and idiosyn-
cratic nature in several ways. This was a measure for four million
recently emancipated people, it was said, and "never before" had
such necessity for aid arisen. That the Congress viewed its special
assistance to be for these freedmen and not their descendants
more than a century later, was clear from their explicit reliance
upon the abolition of slavery provisions of the Thirteenth
Amendment for constitutional authority.19 The Freedmen's
Bureau continued for another few years, using revenue gener-
ated by fees and some later appropriations to provide assistance
to former slaves and the poor generally. Consistent with its
designedly temporary status, the Bureau was abolished in 1872.
The "separate but equal" doctrine in Pessy was fundamen-
tally at odds with the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the reconstruction Congress' rejection of class-based legislation.
That it took sixty years for this proposition to be repudiated by
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of EducationY° is an embar-
rassment to our history as a nation. ChiefJustice Warren's opin-
ion in Brown, striking down the segregation of public schools by
law, was less direct than it might have been and it is sometimes
likened to a sociological essay. In context, Warren curiously did
rely upon non-legal material demonstrating the ill consequences
of segregation on a child's educational development in order to
reach a legal result.
However, Warren came very near to embracing Harlan's dis-
sent in Pessy that the Constitution is color-blind. Indeed, Warren
noted that the strongest proponents of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment intended it "to remove all legal distinctions among 'all per-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 322 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
19. See id. at 941.
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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sons born or naturalized in the United States.'" 21 Yet, Warren
did not come right out and take this definitive view himself. War-
ren's hesitation or unclarity thus invited later years of confusion
entailing sometimes rough forms of racial proportionalism,
rather than a careful remedial identification and elimination of
the vestiges of past discrimination.
The rest of the legal story is well-told in Edward Erler's
paper included in this symposium. 2 2 As Erler reveals, the color-
blind principle was initially incorporated into the text of the
principal civil rights legislation that followed the Brown decision.
Almost immediately thereafter, however, a combination of amor-
phous presidential rhetoric giving rise to the term "affirmative
action," aggressive quota-oriented administrative interpretation
of the same, and a complacent [if not always coherent] judicial
acceptance of explicit racial set-asides in federal contracting pro-
grams2' again took the Nation in a discouraging racially-con-
scious direction. Most recently, however, the Court has returned
to the wiser course of equality. Writing that all racial classifica-
tions, whether intended to be hurtful or helpful, are subject to
strict scrutiny and requiring of a compelling governmental inter-
est, Justice O'Connor in Adarand v. Pefta has largely reaffirmed
the color-blind standard.2 4 There remains disagreement among
the justices with regards to what, if any, interests are compelling
enough to justify the public use of race.
The latest chapter in the constitutional tale is still being writ-
ten, and it involves California's Proposition 209. Passed by a sub-
stantial majority of California voters in 1996, the proposition
amends the California Constitution to preclude any component
of state government from "either discriminating against, or
granting preferential treatment to, any individual or group" on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin. This
embodiment of the color-blind principle was at first preliminarily
enjoined, 25 but the battle is far from over. As Erler speculates,
and a panel of the Ninth Circuit has now held,26 the logic of the
injunction is very likely at odds with the Supreme Court's reason-
21. Id. at 489.
22. Edward Erler, The Future of Civil Rights: Affirmative Action Redivivus, 11
NOTRE DAMFJ.L. ETHics & PUBLIC POL'Y 15 (1997).
23. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). But see Adarand
Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
24. Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
25. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal
1996).
26. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031,
1997 WL 160667 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997).
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ing in Adarand. Indeed, it is hard to fathom how a state provision
which expressly recognizes the supremacy of federal civil rights
laws as well as exempting existing court orders and such other
actions as are necessary to qualify for federal funding could be
held to transgress federal law. It is doubly fatuous to suggest that
a remote case striking an earlier Washington state initiative that
selectively precluded the use of school busing for racial remedy
but not other purposes, 7 invalidates a California amendment
embracing a general principle of non-discrimination. The prior
case employed a prohibited racial classification, the present Cali-
fornia amendment banishes them. As a matter of the law of
equality, the refusal to use race, sex or ethnicity cannot be an
impermissible use of race, sex or ethnicity. In the words of the
Ninth Circuit,
Where a state denies someone a job, an education, or
a seat on the bus because of her race or gender, the injury
to that individual is clear .... Where, as [under Proposi-
tion 209], a state prohibits race or gender preferences at
any level of government, the injury to any specific individ-
ual is utterly inscrutable. No one contends that individuals
have a constitutional right to preferential treatment solely
on the basis of their race or gender.
2 8
Having established that the federal constitution by present
interpretation aspires to be color-blind, and even that the Cali-
fornia Constitution has very likely been successfully amended to
be expressly so, does this fully reconcile law and morality? Or
could it be that, even though the law rightfully precludes the
coercive use of race in public settings, there are circumstances
where moral teaching, and in particular Catholic social teaching,
calls upon private actors to take race into account consistently
with the Catholic principles of subsidiarity and solidarity?
Subsidiarity admonishes us to never arrogate to a higher
level that which can be done more effectively below.29 Solidarity
calls upon us to see ourselves not as individuals, but as members
27. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
28. Coalition for Economic Equity, 1997 WL 160667, at *10.
29. The Catechism provides:
Excessive intervention by the state can threaten personal freedom and
initiative. The teaching of the Church has elaborated the principle of
subsidiarity, according to which a community of higher order should
not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order,
depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in
case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of
the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURcH, para. 1883 (1994).
19971
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of a community - the larger body of Christ."0 Applying these
principles to the present subject, the question becomes whether,
in individually evaluated circumstances, it is morally permissible,
if under not morally preferred, to employ race voluntarily (and
altruistically) to create or share opportunities otherwise unavaila-
ble in private schools, work places, churches, and even families?
In other words, where there is a reality of continuing racial stere-
otype or harm in a particular person's life and that reality
becomes known to us, are we called to seek greater racial recon-
ciliation or solidarity in the specific context of that life, rather
than pretend that race has been socially transcended, when it has
not?
Cardinal Mahony concludes that Catholic teaching, espe-
cially when considered in light of solidarity, "impels us to mend
social relationships torn apart by sin."3' The Cardinal highlights
the teaching of John Paul II that "'evil mechanisms' and 'struc-
tures of sin' . . . can be overcome only through the exercise of
the human and Christian solidarity to which the church calls us
and which she tirelessly promotes."32 These are vitally important
words. They serve to remind us that what the law requires (color-
blindness) may, as in other areas of human action, be only a min-
imum obligation and not the summation of moral duty. Yet, this
greater moral duty is not without its paradox, as it seemingly
invites the voluntary recognition that race may be recognized in
individual circumstance, even as the ultimate moral end may be
the law's own aspiration of color-blindness, or the recognition
that in God's sight, we are all one. 3
30. [The] law of human solidarity and charity [is] dictated and
imposed both by our common origin and by the equality a rational
nature in all men, to whatever people they belong, and by the
redeeming Sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ on the Altar of the Cross to
His Heavenly Father on behalf of sinful mankind.
POPE PIus XII, SuMMi PoNTIFIcATus, para. 35 (1939), reprinted in 4 THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS 5 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981). In the words of the catechism, soli-
darity "presupposes the effort for a more just social order where tensions are
better able to be reduced and conflicts more readily settled by negotiations."
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, para. 1940 (1994). ,
31. Cardinal Roger Mahony, A Call to Solidarity: A Pastoral Statement on
Catholic Social Teaching and Affirmative Action, reprinted in 11 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHics & PUB. POL'Y (1997).
32. JOHN PAUL II, SouicrruDo REi SoclAus, para. 40 (Dec. 30, 1987),
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCuMENTARY HERITAGE 395
(David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon, eds. 1992).
33. I suspect it was this moral paradox that led Justice Brennan in United
States v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), to construe the Civil Rights Act against the
meaning of its color-blind text to allow voluntary, private affirmative action
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Any reservation of the use of race, even a private one, will be
objectionable to some. This interpretation of Catholic social
teaching, it will be said, is as foolish and hurtful as Justice Mar-
shall's proposition that the law must use race to get beyond it.
The claim will be made that all of the injustices associated with
widespread public preferences will exist only more haphazardly
and covertly with individual private attention to race.
This argument cannot be understated or disregarded. The
abuses of public affirmative action are legion. Lance Izumi in
this symposium demonstrates well the unfairness of the failure to
consider the individual circumstance of Asian populations in the
context of the usual black-white paradigm. Izumi writes with
more than a little bitterness:
[W] hen race preference programs injure Asian Americans,
the paradigm [of individual whites paying an African-
American debt] collapses. When the son or daughter of an
impoverished Vietnamese refugee is denied entrance into
a prestigious public university merely because he or she is
not a member of a preferred racial or ethnic group, how is
this harm justified by appeals to historical discrimination
or "lingering effects"?'
Similarly, Michael Lynch demonstrates with statistical irrefutabil-
ity that the University of California's attempt to secure racial pro-
portionality has led to massively unequal application of standards
from the simple fact that high school students from various eth-
nic groups do not qualify in neat, equal proportions. The
result is deliberate inequality and injustice, or as Lynch describes
it by way of analogy, it is like "a basketball game in which every-
one plays on the same court, but some individuals, depending on




Cardinal Mahony's response is to suggest reform of public
affirmative action in order "to root out abuses and to increase its
effectiveness in enabling qualified candidates to compete where
they have been traditionally excluded."3 ' These words, while
efforts. See KMmc, supra note 11, at 169. Justice Brennan's statutory
interpretation can nevertheless be faulted for infidelity to the rule of law. Id.
34. Lance T. Izumi, Confounding the Paradigm: Asian Americans and Race
Preferences, 11 NoTRE DAM J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 121 (1997).
35. Michael Lynch, Affirmative Action at the University of California, 11
NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 139 (1997).
36. Id.
37. Cardinal Roger Mahony, Solidarity and the Common Good: A Pastoral
Response to Proposition 209 (Sept. 3, 1996), reprinted in 11 NoTRE DAMJ.L. ETHics
& PUB. POL'Y 89, 92 (1997).
1997]
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benevolent, are indeterminate, and they may not answer the
moral fallacies of public racial preferences. If there is to be any
continued use of race-based classifications, it must be highly par-
ticularized and voluntarily assumed. Rerum Novarum reminds us
not to disregard the natural and manifold differences among
individuals."8 Pacem in Terris requires that every effort be made
to ensure that people are enabled on the basis of merit to
advance and assume responsibility in society."
No reform of public affirmative action can be true to these
instructions of faith. The hurt felt by Izumi, the illogic of propor-
tional preference carefully demonstrated by Lynch, and even the
stridently ideological condemnation of social security and the GI
bill put forth in this volume by Anthony Platt,' illustrate that
public affirmative action is beyond reform, and it is so because it
presumes to do in law what can only be done in the hearts of
men and women. Public affirmative action creates what Justice
Scalia has aptly termed the false notion of separate creditor and
debtor nations,4 not a community of Christian solidarity. It per-
38. There naturally exist among mankind manifold differences of
the most important kind; people differ in capacity, skill, health,
strength; and unequal fortune is a necessary result of unequal
condition. Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to
individuals or to the community. Social and public life can only be
maintained by means of various kinds of capacity for business and the
playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which
suits his own peculiar domestic condition.
LEo XIII, RERUM NovARuM, para. 17 (1891), reprinted in 2 THE PAPAL ENCY U-
CAts, supra note 30, at 245.
39. "Furthermore, a system must be devised for affording gifted members
of society the opportunity of engaging in more advanced studies, with a view to
their occupying, as far as possible, positions of responsibility in society in
keeping with their natural talent and acquired skill." JoHN XXIII, PACEM IN
TERRmS, para. 13 (1963) reprinted in 5 THE PAPAL ENCYCUCAIS, supra note 30, at
107.
40. Anthony Platt, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, 11 NoTRE DAmE
J.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 67 (1997).
41. In his concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995), Justice Scalia observed: "Individuals who have been
wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under
our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or debtor race.
That concept is alien to the Constitution's focus upon the individual." The
Justice's observation is unassailable as a matter of constitutional law, but of
course, it does not speak to the deeper Christian notion, explicit in the Catholic
teaching on solidarity, that man exists, not alone, but in community. Ken
Masugi in a provocative retelling of the Merchant of Venice in this symposium
comments similarly- "the crisis in civil rights mirrors an even deeper crisis
concerning constitutionalism and modernity in general. Liberalism, with its
emphasis on an abstract individual and limited government is not sufficient
sustenance for the human soul." Ken Masugi, Race, the Rule of Law, and the
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petuates not "love of neighbor," which itself is an admonition
against coerced public racism, but a perpetual demand of
"where's mine?"
Those who disagree with Cardinal Mahony's reliance upon
the unsatisfactory political reform of public racial preferences do
not assume that racial discrimination has been sufficiently elimi-
nated nor do they disregard the Cardinal's proper concern for
lingering racism. Rather, there is simply genuine apprehension
that the Cardinal's articulated position does not fully respond to
the mandate of subsidiarity. Yes, solidarity calls upon us to mend
social relations torn by sin, but subsidiarity enjoins us to under-
stand that this is a personal call, not one directed at government.
The Cardinal's sound instruction to be realistic about the contin-
uing existence of racism in the individual lives of citizens we
encounter becomes obscured, if not undermined, by his later
unqualified reference that it is the "government's role to guaran-
tee the minimum conditions . . . [for] human rights and
justice.
" 4 2
The government has played its role by pointing us to the
morally perfect position of color-blindness. But subsidiarity calls
us to be individually sensitive to the fact, as Law Professor Patricia
Williams comments that "the rules may be color-blind, but peo-
ple are not."4" Williams uses this dichotomy, like Cardinal
Mahony, to support employing the law as a coerced mechanism
for public racial preference. With respect, the dichotomy better
illustrates what the law cannot accomplish, and what individual
sensitivity to race in particular private contexts perhaps can. The
particularized focus of subsidiarity morally allows the creation of
individual racial opportunity to be a variable in private action.
Though given the ill-effects of public racial preferences (for
example, increased racial jealousy and stigma), even private
racial preference should be a cautiously-utilized, secondary mea-
sure. It is far better to apply the Catholic preferential option for
the poor more generously and more generally to rectify social
injustice by addressing economic disadvantage. Certainly, given
the corporate size of some private sector actors, (for example,
international corporations, major private universities), it must
Merchant of Venice: FromSlavey to Citizenship, 11 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & Pun.
POL'Y 197, 200 (1997). How true, and herein lies the vital importance of
intermediary institutions like the family and church being privately sensitive to
race. See generally, DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, CEAsE-FIRE ON THE FAMLY (1995).
42. Mahony, A Call to Solidarity, supra note 31, at 85 (quoting NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 122 (Nov. 18, 1986).
43. PATnciAJ. WnjjAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHrs (1991).
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always be remembered that individual sensitivity to race should
not replicate the mindless numeric comparisons of past prefer-
ence programs in the public sector."
Returning our attention to the specific materials in this sym-
posium, Simon and Alstein demonstrate that transcending race
does not always mean disregarding its presence. These neutral
observers of transracial adoption, who entered upon the empiri-
cal study of this issue "with no social or political agenda," found
overwhelmingly that "transracial adoptions serve the children's
best interests."45 The reformulation of the law to be color-blind
or race-neutral in matters of adoption had nevertheless been
resisted. Public race neutrality in this context was opposed with a
variant of the same weak arguments that today prop up what
remains of discredited programs of public racial preference.
Black children, it was argued, can only be placed with black fami-
lies, or the result would be "cultural genocide."' Simon and
Aistein amassed hard data to the contrary, finding that in multi-
racial families "the child emerges a highly intact Black adult,
aware of and sensitive to his identity and community. The fami-
lies live with the knowledge they have nurtured a productive
member of society, at ease in both Black and White worlds."
4 7
Transracial adoptions work because minority children are
not simply allocated like public racial entitlements. They are
effective because, at the intimate level of the family, transcending
race can be understood as not displacing Blackness or the
44. As Tide VII and other federal laws were erroneously transmuted from
racial intent to disparate impact statutes, some private businesses adopted
quotas, not out of any sense of private Christian solidarity, but as a "cost of
doing business" or insulating themselves from lawsuit. See Kxmnsc, supra note 11,
at 170-71 (1992). As the Wall Sreet Journal reported following the passage of
California's Proposition 209, "[d]espite growing public disgust with quotas,
most of the state's major private employers have no intention of moving away
from group-conscious policies." Heather MacDonald, Race Still Matters to
California Companies, WALL ST.J., Nov. 11, 1996, at A14. Often, these practices
are wholly statistical and not at all particularized, or even rational. As Heather
MacDonald of the Manhattan Institute relates, "while it's plausible to suppose
[ ] that Hispanics tend to know best how to market to Hispanic consumers, the
diversity mandate often leads to a preposterous essentialism." Id. Ms.
MacDonald asked one aircraft manufacturer to explain and he said that "a
racially diverse team would bring 'diverse approaches to problem solving.'" Id.
(quoting Dave Barclay, Vice-President of Hughes), which prompted Ms.
MacDonald to wonder whether "the laws of physics discriminate [.]" Id.
45. RitaJ. Simon & Howard Alstein, The Relevance of Race in Adoption Law
and Social Practice, 11 NoTRE DA~m J.L. ETHICS & Pun. POL'Y 171, 194 (1997).
46. Id. at 172 (quoting Barriers to Adoption: Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 213 (1985)).
47. Id. at 194.
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unique nature of the person God has created. As Michael Eric
Dyson writes:
[T]hose courageous black souls who fought to make
America all that it should be were not interested in what is
presently meant by a color-blind society. True enough,
they were interested in shaping an American society that
wasn't obsessed with race, that didn't use race to unfairly
dispense goods or allocate resources. But most were not
naive enough to believe that we could ever, in the foresee-
able future, arrive at a place where race didn't make a
huge difference in how we live our lives, how we view one
another, how we are granted or denied social privilege. 4a
The legal abolition of public affirmative action holds out the
ideal of a color-blind society. A society without sin. Because on
this earth that society does not, and will not, exist, we are called
upon to be individually sensitive to the stereotypes that remain
among races. We would do well not to forget, however, that the
public law defeats the aspiration for the perfect moral position
either when it perpetuates public racial preference or blocks pri-
vately-extended racial opportunity.
48. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, RACE RuILs: NAVIGATING THE COLOR LINE 223
(1996).
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